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A Descriptive Portrait of State 
Judicial Oversight of State 
Agencies 
Rick A. Swanson 
University of Louisiana at Lafayette 
Studies of sta te ju d icial oversig ht of s tate age nc ies ar e 
practica lly non existent. This is the fi rs t stu dy to offe r a 
detailed descri p tion of th e na tur e of th is ove rs ig ht . A 
dataset was co nst ru cte d of 55 0 state s upr em e co urt cases 
invo l ving j ud ic ia l overs ig h t of fo ur ty p es of age nc ies 
f rom 27 s ta tes fo r th e years /991 to /993 . Th e da ta s how 
th at s tate su pr eme cour t d ecis ions review in g st at e age n cy 
ac t ions com m only occ ur, are ty pi call y un animou s. ar e 
ge nera lly su pp ort ive of th e age ncy ac ti o n, and ar e 
s li gh tly mo re of ten li be ral tha n co nse r va ti ve. Moreove r, 
th ese tr end s are large ly consis tent across st a tes. 
0 ne of the basic tenet s of American government , at both the federal and state levels, is the principle of separation 
of powers . Thus , an important empirical question in evaluating 
American democracy is how the separation of powers plays out 
when different branches of government interact. One such 
interaction occurs when courts review the actions of bureaucratic 
agenci es. This interaction has been extensively studied at the 
federal level, with many studies examining federal court 
oversight of the federal bureaucracy (Canon and Giles 1972, 
Handber g 1979, Hansen et al. 1995, Humphries and Songer 
1999, Kilwein and Brisbin 1996, Sheehan 1992, Spaeth 1963, 
Tannenhaus 1960, Willison 1986). Shapiro (1992) , however , in a 
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review piece outlining the then-current state of judicial politics 
research , lamented the myopic research focus on the federal 
courts , and the Supreme Court in particular , as if it were the only 
court in the United States or even the world . He encouraged 
research that might move outward and downward from the U. S. 
Supreme Court. Shapiro 's observation about the lack of 
scholarship on state courts applies with particular accuracy to the 
study of state court oversight of state bureaucracies . Very few 
such examinations exist , and we know exceptionally little about 
the relationship between state courts and state bureaucracies . 
The only published research to empirically explore the issue 
of judicial oversight at the state level is Frank (1980) . Frank 
examined 533 agency cases from four state supreme courts 
(California, Michigan , New York, and Pennsylvania) for the 
years 1970 through 1974. Frank's exploratory study found over 
85% of agency cases occurred within only seven issue 
categories: social welfare, legal professionalism , fiscal policy , 
professional licensing, public utility regulation, safety-health 
regulation, and labor-manag~ment. In addition, the supreme 
courts of the states studied supported agency decision s from a 
low of 51.3% (Michigan) to a high of 66. 7% (New York) with an 
overall support level of 56.4%. Great variation occurred , 
however , within individual functional areas . For example, state 
supreme courts were most supportive of agency decisions 
involving regulation of the legal profession, supporting such 
actions at a rate of 78.3% (83/106). Toward the lower end of the 
support spectrum , state supreme courts supported social welfare 
agency decisions at a rate of only 42.3% (52/123) , most of which 
involved an agency denial of a benefit to an individual. 
Frank's research was groundbreaking in its study of state 
judicial oversight, _yet remarkably it remains the only published 
state judicial oversight research to date. There is no analytic 
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analysis of such oversight , and numerous descriptive questions 
remain. Although analytic questions are important , addressing 
analytic questions before first describing the nature of this 
oversight would be to put the proverbial cart before the horse. A 
basic description is necessary so one can then decide what 
characteristics of this oversight warrant further, in-depth 
analysis . Among the countless descriptive questions left 
unanswered are: What are judicial support levels for agency 
action s in other states? How frequently do state courts review 
state agency actions? What are the policy areas and ideological 
nature of these agency actions reviewed? To what degree are 
state supreme courts unanimou s or divided in their review 
decisions? Does court support vary between "liberal" or 
"conservative" agency actions ? Does this support vary across 
policy areas? Finally , are any trends that exist consistent across 
states? This study addresses these questions by exploring the 
nature of state supreme court oversight of state administrative 
agencies and offering a descriptive portrait of such oversight. 
METHODS 
Data from a preliminary study conducted by the author 
revealed the five most frequently reviewed agency actions in 
state supreme courts were, in order, the issue areas of attorney 
discipline , social welfare benefits , taxation, environmental 
regulation , and public utility regulation. The latter four 
categories serve as particularly useful categories for studying 
judicial oversight of the bureaucracy. First , these issue 
categorie s tend to have ideological overtones and so most cases 
in these issue areas pose clear ideological choices for courts. 
Second , agency actions in these issue areas often have policy 
significance beyond the particular litigants involved. Thus, the 
latter four issue areas are both more interesting and more 
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important to study than attorney discipline cases. For the full 
study presented here, all signed opinions 1 of agency oversight 
cases in the four selected policy areas which had an agency as a 
named party to the case2 were coded from 27 state supreme 
courts (AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, FL, GA, IN, MD, MA, MI, MO, 
NJ, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, PA, RI, TN, TX, VA, WA, WV, WI, 
and WY) for the years 1991-1993. Due to normal research 
1 Memorandum decisions and per c11ria111 decisions ("by the court " decisions that do not 
list an authoring judge) were not included. This was done for two reasons . First, the 
large majority of these types of' decisions provide only minimal facts and analysis of the 
case involved (and sometimes no discussion at all), so that some of the factors examined 
in this study (such as standard of review) could not be accurately determined by reading 
the case . Second, the very reason such cases are decided as memorandum or per curiam 
decisions is because the issues are so straightforward, and often involve so little 
substance, that the cases are not very instructive to the purposes of this study . As some 
examples, many of the memorandum or per curia,11 decisions observed during coding 
resolved only simple procedural mailers such as the ripeness or mootness of the appeal. 
Other cases simply reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of a recently 
issued state supreme court case . Still others stated merely that the case was being 
affirmed for the reasons expressed in the intermediate appellate court opinion, and 
offered no further discussion or evaluation of the legal issues. 
1 The observations in the study here were limited to cases in which a state-level 
administrative agency engaged in an independent action that was later challenged in 
court, and the agency was a named party . This was done for two reasons . First, in some 
stales , certain types of agencies such as worker 's compensation agencies do not take 
independent actions, but instead go directly to court where a trial court judge makes the 
decision whether and to what degree workers ' compensation benefits should be awarded . 
Thus, there is never an independent agency action to review, and all that an appellate 
court reviews is the trial court decision . This type of case is largely useless to the study 
here which auempts lo determine how courts oversee the acrions of agencies, not simply 
the policy posirions of those agencies . 
Second, also under the administrative procedures of several states, interested 
parties may challenge an agency's action without involving the agency as a party to the 
case . For example , in the workers' compensation scheme in several states, once an 
agency makes a decision regarding benefits , the worker and employer may litigate 
against one another regarding the propriety of those benefits without any further 
involvement by the agency in that litigation . In such situations, the agency often believes 
its particular decision does not warrant the expense of litigation resources , and so the 
agency decides not lo interject itself in the litigation . The inclusion of such cases might 
skew the results of the larger study in which agency actions are directly challenged. 
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constraints, a sample of 27 states was chosen rather than the full 
population of fifty states . Choices were guided by interests in 
providing geographic and population diversity as well as 
institutional variation such as methods of judicial selection and 
retention and judicial term length, as well as the presence or 
absence of an intermediate appellate court. The unit of 
observation consisted of an individual court case. All cases were 
accessed and read on the Lexis/Nexis on-line legal database. The 
final number of observations was 550 cases. 
Variables were operationalized as follows: Cases in which 
the agency won were coded 1, otherwise 0.3 Regarding the 
ideological direction of a case outcome, judicial scholars have 
long accepted the convention of coding certain types of case 
outcomes as liberal or conservative (Segal and Spaeth 1993). 
For the sake of convenience and uniformity only, and consistent 
with general convention, conservative case outcomes are often 
coded 0 and liberal case outcomes are coded 1.4 The liberal-
conservative coding is based on Spaeth's (1990) coding in the 
United States Supreme Court Database, with minor adaptations. 
The following coding scheme is used for the ideological 
direction of a court decision: 
Social Welfare Benefits I= pro-worker's compensation claimant 
pro-public aid claimant 
pro-unemployment compensation 
claimant 
pro-retirement benefits claimant 
0= reverse of above 
3 Cases with an unclear or mixed direction of support (such as affirmed in part and 
reversed in part) were coded 2. · 
4 Cases that had no discernible ideological direction or an unclear ideological direction 
were coded 2. 
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Tax Policy I= pro-taxation 
O= reverse of above 
Public Utility Regulation I= pro-regulation of utility company 
pro-utility rate reduction or limitation 
Environment 




O= reverse of above 
The liberal-conservative distinctions just noted are standard 
conventions in the judicial literature . The " liberal" position is 
deemed to favor social welfare benefits, favor higher taxes in 
order to provide those benefits, favor regulation of businesses, 
and favor protection of the environment. The "conservative" 
position is deemed to be the reverse of those positions. Agency 
actions with liberal outcomes are coded 1, and agency actions 
with conservative outcomes are coded 0. Liberal and 
conservative agency outcomes are defined in the same manner as 
is the ideological direction of the court's decision,just described. 
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RESULTS A D DISCUSSION 
Agency Actions 
The breakdown of the cases into agency categories is 
presented in the Table below. Almost half the cases were social 
welfare cases, comprising 48.4% overall of state supreme court 
cases overseeing state agencies. Social Welfare was comprised 
mostly of worker's compensation cases, but included cases 
involving unemployment benefits, retirement benefits, or public 
welfare benefits as well. 
As the Table indicates, state agencies adopted a conservative 
position in 45.5% of the cases and a liberal position in 48.7% of 
the cases. 5 When the agencies are broken down by category, 
obvious differences appear. An overwhelming 94.9% of tax 
agency actions that reached a state supreme court were the result 
of an individual or business challenging a tax assessment (coded 
as a liberal action) by the agency. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, the agency action in social welfare cases was 
conservative in 79.4% of the cases; i.e. the agency denied or 
limited social welfare benefits to an individual. Of 
environmental agency actions, 74.2% involved liberal agency 
actions where the agency was attempting to restrict the activity 
of a person or business that might degrade the environment. 
Actions by utility regulatory agencies were more evenly 
divided in their ideological leanings, with only 59.0% of utility 
cases involving agency actions that had liberal outcomes such as 
5 In only 5.8% of the cases did the agency action in question possess an ideological 
direction that could not be labeled as clearly "liberal " or clearly "conservative. " For 
example, where a utility regulatory agency adjudicates a dispute between two electricity-
generating companies over the degree to which each has the right to generate electricity, 
it is unclear whether favoring one company over the other is a " liberal" or "conservative " 
agency position . 
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increased regulations or rate limitations being placed on utility 
companies. 
Table 1 
Agency Actions and Court Outcomes by Agency Type6 
Agency Freq. Freq. % Liberal Conserv. % 

















Actions Actions Actions 
Liberal 
52 201 20.6 
131 7 94.9 
49 17 74.2 
36 25 59.0 
268 250 51 .7% 
6 Totals for " liberal'" and "conservative " cases are less than the total number of observed 
cases because only those agency outcomes possessing a clear, unambiguous ideological 
direction were classified as either "liberal" or "conservative ." 
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Table I, cont'd 
Agency Actions and Court Outcomes by Agency Type 
Agency % Court % Court % Court % Court 
Type Support Support Support Outcomes 
(Liberal Agency (Conserv. (Overall) Liberal 
Actions) Agency 
Actions 
Soc . 74.0 53.0 57 3 52.8 
Welfare 
Tax 62.I 83.3 63. I 60.0 
Env't 46.7 70.6 53.2 41.9 
Utilities 68.8 69.6 69.1 51.8 
Total 633 % 56.6% 59.5% 53.2% 
These differences in liberal and conservative outcome rates 
across policy areas are in all likelihood a function of the 
structure of the kinds of disputes occurring in these different 
policy areas rather than a result of ideologically-based behavioral 
influences on the part of agency decision-makers. That is, 
individuals will challenge only a denial or reduction of social 
welfare benefits (defined as a conservative agency outcome) but 
not an increase in such benefits. Similarly, individuals or 
business will challenge only an increase in taxes (defined as a 
liberal agency outcome) but not a reduction in taxes. Thus, 
structurally, social welfare agency outcomes challenged in court 
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are inherently going to be largely conservative , while tax agency 
outcomes challenged in court are inherently going to be largely 
liberal. 
Frequency of Oversight Cases 
State supreme courts issued on average 20.4 signed opinions 
in agency oversight cases during the three-year period studied. 
This equates to 6.8 cases per year. However, individual states 
varied widely in their agency oversight caseloads. Some state 
supreme courts, such as the ones in North Dakota and 
Massachusetts, consistently heard a large number of oversight 
cases from year to year, issuing signed opinions in fifteen-to-
twenty agency cases each year during the period studied. Other 
state supreme courts, such as the ones in Michigan or Georgia , 
were just the opposite , hearing only one or less oversight cases 
per year on average. 
One possible explanation for some of the variation in 
oversight caseloads across states involves the presence or 
absence of an intermediate appellate court in the state. States 
with larger populations possess an intermediate-level appellate 
court, given that an intermediate appellate court helps address 
the higher number of cases being litigated within the state. An 
intermediate appellate-level court relieves much of the supreme 
court 's workload , because otherwise the state supreme court 
would need to hear all appeals within the state . Because of this, 
the presence of an intermediate appellate court also brings a 
greater degree of discretion to the state supreme court in 
choosing which cases it will hear being appealed from the 
intermediate appellate court . This increased docket discretion 
exists because there is less need for the state supreme court to 
hear any given case on appeal when the intermediate appellate 
court has already reviewed the trial court 's decision in that case 
VO L. 34 2006 
68 SWANSON 
for error. It might be the situation that appellate courts are able 
to resolve many agency oversight cases that would otherwise be 
sent to their states' supreme courts, so that state supreme courts 
in such states hear relatively fewer agency oversight cases. 
To see if there is a relationship between the existence of an 
intermediate appellate court in a state and the agency oversight 
caseload of that state's supreme court, agency caseload for the 
three-year period studied was first converted to the percent of a 
supreme court's total discretionary docket allocated to agency 
cases. This was calculated by taking the number of agency 
review cases and dividing by the total discretionary docket. 7 
This controls for the fact that different state supreme courts have 
different total caseloads and different discretionary dockets, such 
that (for example) ten agency cases out of one court's 
discretionary caseload might not be the same resource allocation 
as ten agency cases out of another court's discretionary caseload. 
Then at-test was performed between the different means of the 
percent of discretionary docket allocated to agency oversight 
cases with and without the presence of an intermediate appellate 
court. States without an intermediate appellate court were 
significantly more likely (p<.01) to allocate their discretionary 
docket to the oversight of agency actions. States without an 
intermediate appellate court allocated 7.7% of their total 
discretionary docket in the three-year period studied to cases 
involving agency oversight, versus 1.5% for states without an 
intermediate appellate court, a 6.2% difference. 
The evidence tends to suggest that state supreme courts in 
states with intermediate appellate courts believe their limited 
docket discretion is better used by granting appeals to other 
implicitly more important or consequential types of cases. In 
7 The percent of state supreme court dockets that is discretionary is from State Court 
Caseload Statistics (1993), available from the National Center for State Courts. 
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other words, most agency actions involve adjudications which 
themselves probably appear to have little precedential value or 
consequence beyond the narrow facts and legal questions 
involved in the case. Thus, given a choice between granting an 
appeal in an agency oversight cases versus a case of seemingly 
more important or broader consequence and precedential 
value-such as a case involving the death penalty-- a state 
supreme court which has discretion to choose is more likely to 
grant appeal in the latter case. 
On the other hand, in states without an intermediate court, 
state legislatures generally believe that certain types of cases 
require at least one opportunity for judicial review for error, and 
thus review by the state supreme court is made mandatory in 
many agency cases. For example, in North Dakota, the state 
with the highest number of agency cases in the data here, the 
state legislature has given all litigants disputing an agency action 
a 1ight of appeal to th!! state supreme court.8 In fact, of the eleven 
states without an intermediate appellate court, the supreme 
courts in five of those states--Delaware, Maine, Nevada, West 
Virginia and Wyoming--possessed no docket discretion 
whatsoever. In another three of those states-Mississippi, South 
Dakota and Vermont- the state supreme court had docket 
discretion in the single-digit percentiles. This probably explains, 
for example, why Wyoming recorded the second-highest 
frequency of agency review cases in the data here . West 
Virginia, the other state lacking an intermediate appellate court 
that was included in the study here , contributed 26 observations 
to the data, which stil1 placed it in the upper 3i 11 percentile of the 
examined states. Thus , states without intermediate appellate 
8 Chapter 28-32 -2 1 of the Administrative Agencies Practices Act, N.D. Cent. Code, § 28-
32-2 1 (2000). 
VO L . 34 20 06 
70 SWANSON 
courts possessed significantly higher frequencies of agency 
oversight cases , which was a reflection of the smaller 
discretionary docket those state supreme courts possess. 
Unanimity 
Fully 80% (440/550) of cases were decided by a unanimous 
vote ; only 20.0% of cases overall were nonunanimous. This tells 
us that the most appropriate decisional outcome in agency 
oversight cases is rarely in such dispute that a court divides over 
that outcome. In the vast majority of cases here, a super-
majority of state supreme court justices deciding a case 
coalesced around a single outcome which the justices on the 
court agreed was the most appropriate decisional outcome. 
Importantly , this obviously includes justices of opposite partisan 
and ideological leanings . This comports with the findings of 
Glick and Pruet ( 1986) who found the mean rate of 
nonunanimity across all 50 states for the years 1980-81 was 18.5 
percent. Although a thorough analysis of the possible bases for 
unanimity goes beyond the scope of the discussion here, these 
data support proponents of the legal model of judicial decision-
making , who assert that in most cases there exists a generally 
"correct " or "best" legal outcome which is reasonably 
determinable by reasonable people trained in the law applying 
reasonably objective legal standards . 
Ideological Direction of Judicial Outcomes 
Although state supreme courts differed in their tendency to 
reach liberal versus conservative outcomes across states, the 
tendency is noticeably skewed in favor of liberal outcomes, with 
55.6% of cases overall reaching a liberal outcome. In states with 
more than one observation (Michigan reached 100% liberal 
outcomes with only a single observation) , ideological tendencies 
ranged from 32.1 % liberal outcomes in Rhode Island to 83% 
liberal outcomes in Arizona . In only seven out of 27 states-
T II E ~OU R t\L 0 1: PO LIT IC,\L SC IENCE 
DESCRIPTIVE PORTRAIT OF STATE J UDICJAL OVERSIGHT OF 71 
STATE AGENCIES 
Alabama, Florida , New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee and Texas---did supreme courts reach a greater 
number of conservative than liberal outcomes. As the Table 
reveals , the tendency to reach a majority of liberal outcomes was 
true across agency types as well, with the exception of 
environmental cases. An examination of the possible causes of 
this slight overall liberal-leaning bias is beyond the scope of the 
study here; however, a natural potential suspect is the ideological 
leanings of state supreme court justices. Further studies need to 
examine whether the ideological leanings of state supreme court 
justices has a relationship with state supreme court review of 
state agency actions. What is undisputable , however, is that 
there appears to be a clear and generally consistent tendency for 
state supreme courts to reach a majority of liberal decisions 
when reviewing state agency actions. 
Support for Agency Actions 
Once an agency action reached a state supreme court, those 
courts were fairly equally divided in their overall treatment of 
liberal versus conservative agency decisions, as well as of 
different agency types. The Table demonstrates that state 
supreme courts supported agencies more often than not, with a 
59.5% rate of overall support for the agency actions studied. 
This support rate was generally true across states. In only six out 
of 27 states--C olorado, New Jersey, Pennsylvania , Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, and Texas---did overall support for agency 
actions drop below 50%. Moreover, even in those five states, 
only New Jersey 's level of support was particularly low at 25%, 
whereas the other four states still supported agency actions at 
least 40% of the time. As the Table shows, this was consistent 
across agency types as well. 
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One thing is clear from these data: state supreme courts 
support a majority of the actions by state-level administrative 
agencies (approximately 60% overall), and this tendency to 
support more than half of agency actions occurs across most 
states and across ideological outcomes of agency actions . 
Studies of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, on the other hand, show that these federal courts uphold 
around 70% of agency actions (e.g. Sheehan 1992). One 
possible explanation for the lower support rate of state agencies 
might be the fact that state agencies tend to possess fewer 
resources than do federal agencies (Funk 1991). State agencies 
generally have fewer personnel (both technical and legal) and 
smaller funds to commission investigations and evaluations by 
independent experts. In either situation , a reviewing court is 
probably more likely to overturn agency conclusions , especially 
when those conclusions are rebutted by experts for the agency's 
litigation opponent. 
A second possible reason for the difference in the level of 
federal court support for federal agencies and state supreme 
court support for state agencies is the type of agency actions 
most frequently litigated in appeals. By far the largest category 
of agency actions that were considered by state supreme courts 
in the cases observed involved adjudicatory actions , in which an 
agency decides the outcome of a dispute between the agency and 
a regulated entity. The large majority of these adjudications , 
moreover, involved an issue of statutory interpretation. In this 
category of administrative law cases , courts apply a de nova 
standard of review where courts decide the case "from new" 
without any presumption of correctness being given to the 
agency 's interpretation of law. This is because interpreting 
statutes or other laws (such as Constitutions or treaties) is the 
precise nature of expertise that courts possess. They are the 
entity that is best in a position of legal knowledge and 
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experience to interpret laws, and courts regularly and expressly 
offer this justification for applying the de novo standard of 
review. Put simply, "an erroneous interpretation of a statute by 
an administrative agency is not entitled to deference" ( Woods v. 
Executive Director of Communities and Development, 583 
N .E.2d 845 ([Mass.1992]). The fact that the large majority of 
cases in the study here were reviewed by this standard of review 
probably accounts for why the overall level of support for 
agency actions is not higher. 
On the other hand, only 7.1 % of observed cases involved 
judicial review of rulemaking actions. These types of agency 
actions receive the greatest proclaimed deference from courts. In 
reviewing agency rulemaking actions, courts apply the "arbitrary 
and capricious" test, "substantial evidence" test or some other 
analogous standard of review that gives a high degree of 
deference to the technical and policy expertise of the agency. A 
common expression of deference was provided by the North 
Dakota Supreme when it declared, "This court exercises restraint 
and will not act as a 'super board' when reviewing administrative 
agency findings and determinations ... We should not substitute 
our judgment for that of qualified experts in the administrative 
agencies " (Hins v. Lucas Western [and Job Service North 
Dakota], 484 N.W.2d 491, 494-95 ([N.D. 1992]). 
The legal standard of review has been considered as a factor 
in only a single prior judicial study (Humphries and Songer 
1999) which involved the federal Courts of Appeal, and the 
results here are inconsistent with those findings. In the data 
here, there was no statistically significant difference between the 
support rates in cases involving a deferential versus non-
deferential standard of review. It should be emphasized that 
these findings are tentative only, and certainly call for additional 
study. A more detailed analysis of the bases for state court 
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support of state agencies is beyond the scope of the article here 
but is certainly a promising avenue of further research. 
CONCLUSION 
State supreme court decisions reviewing state agency actions 
are frequent, typically unanimous, and generally supportive of 
the agency action. Reviewing actions also more often result in 
liberal rather than conservative case outcomes, although this 
trend is only slight. Perhaps the most surprising result is that all 
these trends just mentioned are generally consistent across states, 
with relatively few exceptions. 
The data here, however, raise as many or more questions for 
possible future study as they answer. What are the numerous 
causal factors that influence state supreme courts whether to rule 
in favor of state agencies? Is it the expertise of agency experts, 
or the lack of technical expertise by judges, or a combination 
thereof? Does this expertise by either agency employees or 
judges vary across policy areas? Is the degree of support for 
agencies also driven in pa1t by the public's ideological attitudes 
within the state? In a related manner, to what degree do judges 
tend to favor agency outcomes that comport with those judges' 
own ideological leanings? And does the influence of the public 's 
or judges' ideological makeup on agency oversight vary 
depending on the agency type or nature of the agency action in 
question as adjudicatory or rulemaking? Also, does the legal 
standard of review that is applied in a case affect the likelihood 
of support for the agency action at issue, and does this vary by 
agency type? 
There is also the question of how institutional factors beyond 
the presence of an appellate court influence support for agency 
actions. How do such institutional features as judicial selection 
and retention mechanisms influence such support? For 
example , do elected judges respond to the public 's attitudes in 
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overseeing agency actions , or do appointed judges respond to the 
attitudes of the governor or legislature in such cases? Does 
length of judicial term influence agency oversight in any manner, 
and if so to what degree? Also, in many states , there are 
constitutional or legislative mechanisms set up whereby the 
legislature or governor or both can review agency actions 
directly, especially rulemaking actions . How does such an 
institutional structure affect judicial oversight of agency actions? 
For example, do courts defer to the agency oversight expressly 
or impliedly performed by governors or legislatures? And does 
this vary by agency type or nature of the agency action in 
question, as adjudicatory or rulemaking? And how does the 
ideology of judges interact with all these institutional 
mechanisms when judicial oversight of agency actions occurs? 
As can be seen, there is a plethora of these and many more 
unanswered questions surrounding state supreme court oversight 
of state administrative agencies that await future, more analytic 
studies. Nevertheless, the descriptive data here have begun to 
paint the broad outline regarding state supreme court oversight 
of state administrative agencies. It remains for numerous 
additional studies to add further detail to that portrait . 
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